Brother Can You Spare a Dime? Peer Effects in Charitable Solicitation by Jonathan Meer
This work is distributed as a Discussion Paper by the 
 






SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 08-35 
 
Brother Can You Spare a Dime?  




Jonathan Meer  







Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research 
Stanford University 















The Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research at Stanford University supports research bearing on 
economic and public policy issues.  The SIEPR Discussion Paper Series reports on research and policy 
analysis conducted by researchers affiliated with the Institute.  Working papers in this series reflect the views 
of the authors and not necessarily those of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research or Stanford 







Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? 































*I  am  extremely  grateful  to  Nicole  Arshan,  B.  Douglas  Bernheim,  Michael  Boskin, 
Heather  Campbell,  Katherine  Carman,  Giacomo  De  Giorgi,  Cynthia  DiTullio,  Claire 
Fowler,  William  Hardt,  Han  Hong,  Caroline  Hoxby,  Seema  Jayachandran,  Soohyung 
Lee, Darwin Miller, Liam P. Morton, Sriniketh Nagavarapu, Harvey S. Rosen, Andres 
Santos, Jeffrey H. Yellin, and members of Stanford University’s Labor Reading Group 
for useful suggestions. This research was supported in part by the Stanford Institute for 
Economic Policy Research and by the Koret Foundation. 
 Abstract 
 
While the effects of peers on charitable giving have been of considerable interest 
to social scientists, there is little empirical evidence on the magnitude of these effects. A 
correlation between giving or volunteering by one’s peers and one’s own giving can be 
driven by self-selection into groups, common shocks that inspire both the solicitor to ask 
and the individual to give, or social influence. Using data from a university, this paper 
analyzes whether alumni are more likely to give and give larger amounts when they are 
solicited by someone with whom they have social ties. Freshman year roommate assign-
ments and the structure of the university’s giving campaigns are used to overcome prob-
lems of selection and common shocks. Social ties play a strong causal role in the decision 
to donate and the average gift size. Additionally, a solicitor’s request is much more effec-
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 1. Introduction 
 
The effects of peers on charitable giving have been of considerable interest to social 
scientists. This interest is motivated by two considerations. First, the underprovision of public 
goods due to free-riding is a potentially serious problem. Behavioral norms may develop within 
groups to dissuade such behavior – that is, those who do not contribute their perceived fair share 
may be ostracized. If free-riding is considered socially unacceptable and enforced with social 
pressure, then underprovision may be reduced. Second, peer effects may distort giving between 
charities. If social pressure (rather than providing information) shifts an individual’s giving from 
his or her desired level, certain public goods may receive more funding at the expense of others. 
To the extent that donations to different charities are substitutes, this may lead to suboptimal al-
location of funding.
1 The strength of these social influences imply that charities supported by 
those with large social networks or a strong ability to leverage these connections will attract 
more funding than they otherwise would, while those charities with weaker connections will suf-
fer, irrespective of their merit or individuals’ true valuation. For instance, universities can rely on 
networks of alumni volunteers to solicit their friends, while a lesser-known charity may be una-
ble to reach as many people. Charitable organizations put great stock in the notion that personal 
solicitation  by  acquaintances  is  effective,  “often  design[ing]  their campaigns  to  leverage the 
power of social influences” (Carman [2004]). With an estimated $306 billion donated in the 
United States in 2007 (GivingUSA [2008]), these effects may be quite large.  
Unfortunately, there is scant empirical evidence on the magnitude of peer effects in cha-
ritable solicitation; a recent New York Times Magazine article argued that charities “go by noth-
ing more than a few rules of thumb, some of which may be profoundly insightful and others a 
good  deal  less  so”  (Leonhardt  [2008]).  That  there is a  correlation  between  solicitation  by  a 
                                                 
1 Reinstein [2006] finds that charities, for the most part, are substitutes for each other.  2 
 
known person and giving is undeniable (see, for example, Bekkers [2004]), but that relationship 
does not shed any light on causality. 
The absence of hard evidence concerning peer solicitation is unsurprising in light of the 
challenges associated with the estimation of peer effects. Manski [1993] explains some of the 
factors that can confound estimation. First, there are correlated effects, in which similar characte-
ristics or experiences affect donations. For instance, individuals may give more when they are 
solicited by a friend because they share similar beliefs; these shared beliefs manifest themselves 
in the solicitor’s volunteerism and the individual’s giving, leading to a correlation that is unre-
lated to social pressure. Another reason for similar behavior in a group are contextual effects, in 
which peers’ exogenous characteristics affect the individual’s giving. For instance, an individual 
may be reminded to donate to a charity fighting a certain disease if he or she has a friend with 
that disease. Finally, Manski notes the possibility of endogenous effects, in which the individu-
al’s giving is affected by peers’ giving. Taken together, these effects make it quite difficult to 
identify the independent impact of personal solicitation. This paper uses a unique data set to iso-
late the incremental effect of being solicited by a familiar person over a stranger. Additionally, 
we investigate whether shared characteristics between the solicitor and the donor, such as race, 
are important.  
The data set used in this paper, described in greater detail below, has a number of features 
which allow us to measure the true effect of personal solicitation. The data come from a selective 
research university, henceforth referred to as Anon U, and contain information about each alum-
nus’s annual donations, along with detailed demographic information. In particular, we know 
whether the alumnus volunteered for the university and in what capacity. Additionally, we have 
information regarding freshman year room assignments, which provide an avenue through which 3 
 
to isolate the effect of being asked to donate by a peer – defined, for the purposes of this paper, 
as someone with whom the individual has a social relationship. As noted below, at Anon U 
freshman year rooms are not sorted on any unobservable characteristics that can plausibly affect 
giving. One might be concerned that roommates have similar experiences in college, and these 
correlated effects drive giving. We address this possibility in two ways. First, we examine differ-
ent  facets  of  volunteering. Specifically,  because  those with high  affinity  for  the  school  may 
choose to volunteer in different ways, many of which do not involve fundraising, we can deter-
mine whether having a former roommate who is a fundraiser has a greater effect than having a 
former roommate who is some other type of volunteer. The type of volunteerism is unrelated to 
the size of a volunteers’ gift when he or she is not volunteering; therefore, these non-soliciting 
volunteers provide a control for shared affinity for the university. Second, estimates with donor 
fixed effects, which compare giving in years in which the alumnus is and is not solicited by an 
acquaintance, control for any time-invariant individual effects, such as shared experience or af-
finity. Fixed effects estimation also addresses possible concerns about contextual effects. While 
every alumnus has had, at minimum, the same basic experience of attending Anon U, it is possi-
ble that certain characteristics of a freshman year roommate are associated with both that room-
mate’s volunteering and the alumnus’s affinity for the school. For instance, having a gregarious 
freshman year roommate may lead the individual to have a better experience and therefore higher 
affinity; that same characteristic may make the roommate more likely to be a volunteer – specifi-
cally, a solicitor. This mechanism seems unlikely to have a large confounding effect on the re-
sults; if so, models including donor fixed effects, which account for such relationships, will be 
dramatically different from models that do not include fixed effects. 4 
 
Thus, we have addressed the concerns discussed above, leaving only the true incremental 
effect of personal solicitation. However, the channels by which solicitation works may yet be 
unclear. After all, one could give more when asked by an acquaintance because one feels pres-
sured, or because one is given information about the charity’s activities and discovers a previous-
ly unknown affinity. Information provision may be more effective when coming from a peer, but 
this still reflects a social influence, namely, that information coming from a peer must be at-
tended  to  more  thoroughly  than  that  coming  from  a  stranger.
2  As  explained  in  Section  4.1, 
though, the estimates of peer pressure in this framework are likely to be lower bounds; the true 
effect may be larger. 
Section 2 reviews some pertinent literature, with particular attention to prior attempts to 
quantify the importance of social pressure and solicitation. Section 3 describes the data set, while 
Section  4 presents results.  We  distinguish  between  the  probability  of  making  a  gift and  the 
amount of the gift, conditional on giving. We find evidence that personal solicitation exerts a 
powerful influence on the probability of making a gift and on the overall amount of the gift; the 
inclinations of charities to try to exploit social networks seem justified. Further, we find that the 
effects of solicitation are strongest when both parties are the same race. The effect of a match in 
social attitudes, as proxied by membership in one of Anon U's fraternities or sororities, or in aca-
demic achievement, as proxied by academic honors, are also substantial, though less strong. Ath-
letic status does not seem to affect the efficacy of solicitation. Section 5 concludes with a sum-
mary and suggestions for future research. 
                                                 
2 Our sample involves a single charity, with whom all of those solicited are familiar. The Communications and De-
velopment offices provide frequent updates regarding campus activities, so all alumni should have some degree of 
familiarity with current events at the university. Informal discussions with a number of Anon U alumni indicated 
that they are almost never given information of which they were not aware during these solicitation calls. The De-
velopment Office periodically surveys alumni in a more scientific manner; it is our hope that questions such as these 
will be included on the next survey. 5 
 
 
2. Previous Literature 
 
There is a voluminous literature on interdependence of preferences, particularly in charit-
able  giving  (for  two  thorough  surveys,  see  Vesterlund  [2006]  or  Andreoni  [2006]).  Becker 
[1974], in developing a theory of interpersonal interactions, notes that “apparent ‘charitable’ be-
havior can also be motivated by a desire to avoid the scorn of others or to receive social ac-
claim.” Bernheim’s [1994] model of conformity assumes that individuals care about how others 
perceive them and strive to behave within social norms, and Harbaugh [1998] posits that prestige 
is a driving factor in donations. Examining the effect of giving by reference groups, such as 
people with similar incomes, Feldstein and Clotfelter [1976] include average giving by these 
groups as an explanatory variable for an individual’s giving. They find “no support for the view 
that the total amount that an individual contributes is a function of the amount given by others,” 
but Andreoni and Scholz [1988], examining socio-demographic reference groups, do find evi-
dence of interdependent preferences. It is important to note, however, that people in these groups 
are unlikely to know each other, and defining reference groups is inherently difficult. 
Social comparisons have also been shown to play a role. Frey and Meier [2004] and 
Shang and Croson [2004] design field experiments manipulating information given to a prospec-
tive donor on the proportion of his or her peers who have already donated and the amount a pre-
vious donor gave, respectively. Frey and Meier find that, when donors’ previous giving history is 
taken  into  account,  the  participation comparison  exerts  a  small  influence  on  the decision  of 
whether or not to give. Shang and Croson find that a relatively high comparison amount is asso-
ciated with an increase of approximately 12 percent in the donor’s gift. Alpizar et al. [2008], 
who manipulate anonymity and reciprocity in addition to social reference points, find that a high 
social reference point tends to increase gifts slightly, but a low social reference actually decreas-6 
 
es gifts. While these social reference experiments provide valuable insight to how individuals 
compare themselves to others, they do not shed light on how these donors are directly influenced 
by those they know. 
Experimental results indicate that social distance – the degree of familiarity with others – 
is important to solicitation response. In lab experiments of linear public goods games, Andreoni 
and Petrie [2001, 2004] find that revealing photographs of the other participants has a positive 
effect on contributions that is even larger than revealing the distribution of group contributions; 
they conclude that “fears that social effects could interfere with the strict economic incentives are 
indeed well justified.” Interestingly, Landry et al.’s [2007] field experiment finds that door-to-
door solicitation is far more effective at yielding a high participation rate than mailing, but condi-
tional on responding, households contacted by mail donate far more. One presumes that it is far 
more difficult to say ‘no’ to a solicitor on one’s doorstep than it is to ignore a letter.  
In a similar vein, Schervish and Havens [1997] use survey data to conclude that “the me-
thod of direct contact may be as important as just contact… higher levels of contribution involve 
a personal contact by a previously known individual.” Long [1976] also finds that personal soli-
citations are more effective, particularly when the request comes from a person that the individu-
al knows. Bekkers [2004] examines giving in the Netherlands and concludes that “solicitations to 
contribute are more often successful when they are made by a person with a stronger relationship 
to the potential donor or volunteer because a refusal to contribute will endanger the relationship 
with the solicitor.” However, much of this conclusion is based on responses to hypothetical sce-
narios; Bekkers concedes that “intentions are usually more positive than actual behavior… [and] 
the scenarios elicited socially desirable responses.” Moreover, none of these studies address the 
factors which confound estimation of the effects of personal solicitation. 7 
 
  A further topic of interest is the potential interaction between solicitor and donor charac-
teristics. In the economics literature, Landry et al. [2007] find that the physical attractiveness of a 
female solicitor has an effect on the likelihood that a male subject makes a gift. Shang et al. 
[2004] find that donations are substantially higher when the reference amount provided to a 
prospective donor refers to a previous donor who is of the same gender. List and Price [2008] use 
matches on race and gender to proxy for social distance and find limited evidence of the impor-
tance of these connections, though their sample size is relatively small. In a larger sense, these 
papers fall into the literature on homophily, which posits that individuals form closer bonds with 
those who are like themselves (for a survey, see McPherson et al. [2001]). Psychologists have 
used experiments to study these interactions as well. Bryan and Test [1967] find that whites are 
less likely to make a donation to the Salvation Army if the solicitor is black. Yinon and Sharon 
[1985] find that secular subjects are influenced by whether their religious views coincide with 
the solicitor. Sole et al. [1975] examine opinion similarity in a series of experiments and find that 
“the absence of disagreement about important matters is the most critical determinant of promo-
tive social relationships.” It seems evident that these interactions do exert an effect on both the 
formation of relationships and, more specifically, giving behavior. See Bekkers and Wiepking 
[2007] for a thorough overview of the pertinent literature. 
  One recent study that thoroughly examines peer effects in charitable giving using empiri-
cal data is Carman [2004]. She is able to identify non-self-selected groups of people who are 
likely to know each other using workplace mail codes and team assignments and shows that in-
creased mean giving within a group leads to higher individual contributions. Her data also con-
tain the identity of the team captain, who is responsible for encouraging team members to partic-
ipate, and she posits that the strong correlations in intra-team giving behavior are due in part to 8 
 
unobservable characteristics of this leader, which “should be interpreted as social influences.” 
However, she focuses on identifying how changes in the group’s behavior affect the individual, 




The construction of our sample is guided by the practices of Anon U’s development of-
fice. The fundraising year begins on July 1. Every alumnus receives at least two mailings and, in 
recent years, several emails, during the first eleven months of the giving cycle. In general, few 
personal solicitations are made during this 11-month period, excepting a small number of very 
large donors. In June, the strategy shifts. A list of the alumni in a particular class year who have 
not yet contributed are given to volunteers from the same class, who begin by picking the names 
of those they know off the list. Additionally, they are assigned a number of other non-donors. 
These volunteers are asked to make a personal solicitation, generally by telephone. Alumni who 
have made gifts during the previous 11 months are not subject to any further solicitation. Our 
analysis sample focuses on the alumni who are contacted in June. In effect, these are the margin-
al givers who are subject to the treatment of personal solicitation.
3 Although an attempt is made 
to reach each alumnus, our data do not indicate whether personal solicitation actually occurred; 
however, given the structure of this process, direct solicitation is very likely to have taken place 
when the volunteer and the alumnus know each other. However, it is important to note that soli-
citors may start encouraging their friends to give earlier in the year, either directly or simply by 
discussing their volunteer activities.  
                                                 
3 Gifts made in June tend to be far smaller – the mean positive gift is $613, compared to $1441 during the rest of the 
year. Dropping the top 1% of gifts, the mean positive gift is $168 in June, compared to $358 during the rest of the 
year. 9 
 
Our data are extracted from the administrative archives of Anon U’s Development Of-
fice, which contain information on all alumni donations from 1983 to 2007. The data are proprie-
tary and sensitive, and individuals’ names were stripped from the records before being made 
available to us. Our unit of observation is a yearly giving opportunity. For example, if an indi-
vidual has been an alumna for 5 years, she accounts for 5 giving opportunities in our analysis, 
starting in the first fiscal year after graduation. Multiple gifts in the same year are summed to-
gether. The Development Office data also include information on academic major, extracurricu-
lar activities when the alumnus was an undergraduate, post graduate education, occupation, resi-
dence, whether he or she is married to another graduate of Anon U, several variables that can be 
considered as proxies for affinity (such as payment of class dues), as well as information on the 
alumnus’s volunteer activities
4 and freshman year roommates. Anon U’s Registrar supplemented 
these data with information on SAT scores, academic honors, ethnicity, type of high school, 
summary evaluations made by the Admissions Office during the application process, and grade 
point average. The Registrar’s data are available only for the classes of 1972 to 2005, so we re-
strict our analysis to this group of individuals, 35,583 alumni totaling  583,496 observations. 
However, roommate information is unavailable for the classes of 1993, 1994, and 1996, and 
start- and stop-dates for volunteer spells are sparse prior to the year 1992. Dropping those obser-
vations, along with others missing roommate information and other covariates and those individ-
uals who lived in singles during their freshman year leaves 259,642 observations from 1992 to 
2007, of which 155,807 are associated with a gift. As described above, we will further restrict 
our attention to those who did not give in the first 11 months of each annual giving campaign. 
                                                 
4 11,065 relevant volunteer spells with complete start- and stop-dates are observed. Entry of these dates into the da-
tabase fell to the Development Office (i.e. they are not self-reported), and there is no reason to believe that the miss-
ing data is not missing-at-random. An imputation method is used to bring the total number of spells to 12,845. When 
those imputed spells are not used, the results are very similar both qualitatively and quantitatively. 10 
 
This leaves 139,869 observations on 18,060 alumni; 25.8 percent of these opportunities result in 
a gift. The mean positive gift is $614.62, while the median positive gift is $72.73.  
Identification of the effect of direct solicitation requires that relationships are not self-
sorted and that one can account for the effects of joint experience. Merely observing that those 
who have a relationship with a solicitor tend to give more does not mean that solicitation is at 
work; people sort into groups based on interests that are likely to be related to affinity for the 
university, such as athletics, social clubs, and other extracurricular activities. Affinity for the 
university will, of course, be a primary determinant of giving. In order to avoid this confounding 
factor, we look at relationships based on freshman year room assignments.
5 At Anon U, fresh-
man roommates are not randomly assigned; however, the matching is unlikely to have an effect 
in this context. Matriculating students are randomly sorted into a residential living unit. Each 
unit’s staff then assigns rooms based on both factors that we observe as well as a preference form 
filled out by the incoming student. An Anon U administrator explained that they “try to do as 
much mixing as [they] consciously can,” negatively sorting on characteristics such as geographic 
origin, race, academic interests, athletics and other activities. Fortunately, we observe and in-
clude all of these factors as covariates. In addition, preferences such as smoking, sleeping, and 
cleanliness habits are taken into account. While these data are not available, it seems implausible 
that such factors might affect affinity or giving behavior in a meaningful way, except possibly in 
extreme cases; if this is indeed an issue, fixed effects estimates will account for them. Important-
ly, Anon U administrators never honor roommate requests. All in all, freshman year rooms offer 
a peer group that can reasonably be classified as untainted by self-selection, conditional on ob-
served characteristics. 
                                                 
5 College roommate assignments have been exploited to measure peer effects on  academic outcomes and other 
choices, such as alcohol use; see, for instance, Sacerdote [2001], Kremer and Levy [2003], Zimmerman [2003], and 
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner [2006]. 11 
 
A second potentially confounding factor is shared experience. A freshman who goes on 
to become a solicitor for Anon U presumably had good experiences there. It stands to reason that 
her roommate would be more likely to have had a good experience as well, leading to higher giv-
ing that is unrelated to solicitation. However, alumni can do volunteer work for the university in 
a number of ways, many of which do not involve solicitation. We group volunteers into four 
groups: solicitors; reunion volunteers; university volunteers, and regional volunteers; alumni can 
volunteer in different roles at the same time. The role of the solicitors is clear, while reunion vo-
lunteers organize and promote Anon U’s reunions for their class. University volunteers include 
class leaders, trustees, advisory councils, and alumni councils. Finally, regional volunteers in-
clude regional leaders who organize activities for local alumni as well as alumni who interview 
prospective students. The latter three groups are not involved in solicitation. If shared experience 
is the primary driver for higher giving, then all facets of volunteering will have a significant ef-
fect on giving, since they will proxy for these correlated effects. If we assume that those who 
have a strong affinity for the school do not systematically select into being solicitors rather than 
other brands of volunteerism and solicitation is truly at work, only the variable corresponding to 
having a freshman roommate who is now a solicitor will have an effect. In essence, the other vo-
lunteer types serve as a diagnostic for whether the solicitor roommate effect is driven by shared 
experience. However, the assumption mentioned above is crucial to the identification strategy 
and warrants further investigation, though there is no reason to suppose that alumni with high 
affinity are more likely to be solicitors than other types of volunteers.
6 The best measure of affin-
                                                 
6  Alumni  of  a  different type  may  be  more  likely  to  become  solicitors,  which  could  confound  estimates if the 
attributes that lead individuals to become solicitors are correlated with positive shared experience. For instance, a 
extroverted freshman year roommate may cause the alumnus to have a better experience and therefore higher affini-
ty; that same characteristic may make the roommate more likely to become a solicitor. If this sort of contextual ef-
fect is indeed important, then models including fixed effects, which account for such relationships, will be dramati-
cally different from models that do not include fixed effects. The results in Section 4.2 indicate that they are not, so 
we conclude that these types of contextual effects are not of great importance in this framework. 12 
 
ity available is gift giving, so we compare giving among the different volunteer types.
7 Further, it 
stands to reason that solicitors, who are more aware of the university’s financial needs and are 
involved in the process of raising funds, would be larger givers. With that in mind, it may make 
more sense to look at these individuals’ giving in the years in which they are not volunteers. Ta-
ble 1 shows summary statistics for different types of volunteers in non-volunteer years. While 
solicitors are slightly more likely to give in non-volunteer years, the differences are not substan-
tial, and the means for giving for reunion and university volunteers are very similar to those of 
solicitors, while those for regional volunteers are somewhat lower. Medians for solicitors, reu-
nion volunteers, and university volunteers are nearly identical: $126.17, $122.07, and $125.00, 
respectively; regional volunteers have a median gift of $103. Altogether, it seems unlikely that 
there is sorting on affinity among the different facets of volunteering. Taken together with the 
extensive set of controls and the nature of the roommate assignment discussed above, we are 
confident that the solicitor roommate coefficient has a causal interpretation: the incremental ef-
fect of being solicited by a known person. 
Each variable of interest is defined dichotomously: 1 if one or more of the alumnus’s 
freshman year roommates is a volunteer of that type in a given year. Individuals often transition 
into and out of volunteering; for instance, conditional on being a solicitor in a given year, ap-
proximately 44 percent of alumni are not solicitors in the following year. 2,846 alumni serve as 
solicitors who have former roommates in the June sample, for an average total of 2.56 years over 
the course of the sample. These are associated with 10,735 observations on 4,137 former room-
mates of these solicitors in the June sample. In the years in which an alumnus or alumna has a 
former roommate who is now a solicitor, his or her probability of giving in June is 29.5 percent, 
                                                 
7 We also examine the effect of being a volunteer on likelihood of being current on class dues, as well as having 
never paid class dues. While there are some differences between the four facets of volunteering on both measures, 
none are particularly large. The full results of these exercises are available on request. 13 
 
with a mean positive gift of $745 and a median gift of $100. By contrast, in those years in which 
there is no solicitor roommate, the probability of giving is 25.4 percent, with a mean positive gift 
of $602 and a median gift of $73. Dropping the top 1 percent of gifts, the means are $349 and 
$264, respectively. In raw terms, at least, having a roommate who is a solicitor is related to giv-
ing. 
Table A1 provides definitions and summary statistics for the variables used in this study.  
 
4. Econometric Model and Results 
 
Social pressure may have different effects on the extensive and intensive margins. Va-
riables such as economic resources (James and Sharpe [2007]), household income and employ-
ment type (Smith et al. [1995]), matching and lead donor treatments (Huck and Rasul [2007]), 
and likelihood of being contacted by phone rather than by mail (Meer and Rosen [2008]), have 
been found to have different effects on the probability of giving and the amount of giving. Lan-
dry et al. [2007] find that direct social pressure (in their case, in the form of in-person door-to-
door solicitation) leads to relatively high participation rates, but low gift sizes. These results sug-
gest that the econometric model should allow the effects of a given variable on the extensive and 
intensive margins to differ.  
The first variable of interest, therefore, is the probability of making a gift, which we 
model with a probit. It takes the form 
(1) Prob[Yit > 0] = Prob[εit > -(SRitb1 + VOLitb2 + Xitb3 + YEARtb4 + LOCitb5 + CLASSib6)] 
where SRit is an indicator signifying that alumnus i has a former roommate who is a solicitor in 
year t, VOLit are the other roommate volunteer variables for alumnus i in year t, Xit is the vector 
of covariates described in Table A1, including race; gender; years since graduation and its qua-
dratic; type of secondary school; SAT scores; admissions office ranking on academic and non-14 
 
academic factors; whether the individual played a club sport, was a varsity athlete, joined a so-
cial club, or received academic honors; academic major and minor; advanced degrees; a set of 
affinity proxies, such as whether the individual pays class dues; whether the individual’s spouse 
also attended Anon U; and whether it is a reunion year (multiple of 5 years since graduation). 
YEARt is a set of time effects, LOCit is a set of location effects (state or foreign country of resi-
dence), and CLASSi is a set of class effects (equal to one if the alumnus graduated in a given 
year and zero otherwise). The year and class effects help control for correlated effects – they ac-
count for common influences within a cohort or a year that may lead to both increased volunteer-
ing and increased giving. The error term εit is normally distributed, leading to the probit model. 
Since nearly all alumni in the sample are contacted by a classmate, the coefficient b1 can be in-
terpreted as the increase in the likelihood of giving due to being contacted by a known person 
rather than a stranger. In essence, then, this is the effect of social pressure applied by a friend or 
acquaintance. 
We also estimate the amount of giving, conditional on making a gift. We take the loga-
rithm of the amount to account for the long right tail on the distribution of giving.
8 Assuming 
that gifts are distributed log normal, conditional on a gift being given, we use the OLS estimator 
using nonzero observations:
9 
(2) log(Yit) = SRitg1 + VOLitg2 + Xitg3 + YEARtg4 + LOCitg5 + CLASSig6 + µit if Yit > 0 
The coefficient g1 measures the difference in the conditional means of giving for those 
who give for those who do and do not have a solicitor roommate in year t. It is simple, further, to 
                                                 
8 In addition, we re-estimate a model with the top 1 percent of gifts dropped. The results are qualitatively un-
changed, though of course the baseline amount is different. 
9 Imbens and Wooldridge [2008] argue that estimates using OLS can be biased if the linearity assumption does not 
hold globally. They suggest examining normalized differences of means of covariates for the two samples being 
compared (in this case, those with and without solicitor roommates). They suggest that if these differences exceed 
0.25, then linear regressions may not be appropriate. None of the covariates in X, YEAR, LOC, or CLASS differs by 
more than 0.14 in the June sample, and most have a normalized difference of less than 0.05. 15 
 
combine the estimates in (1) and (2) to calculate marginal effects on the mean of giving, condi-
tional on the controls, with standard errors estimated using the delta method. These estimates 
measure the incremental increase in the average gift associated with peer solicitation. It is impor-
tant to note, though, that in order to make causal inferences using (2), the error term must be dis-
tributed with a mean of 0, conditional on making a gift. This assumption is the primary differ-
ence between this model and the two-step selection model. There is a surprising amount of con-
troversy in the literature about which model is superior in what situations (see Leung and Yu 
[1996] for a thorough discussion of the issues). Without exclusionary restrictions – that is, va-
riables that affect the probability of making a gift but not the amount given – the selection mod-
el’s performance is suspect. However, when we estimate this model in the two-step framework, 
the marginal effects are quite similar to those in Table 1; for instance, the peer solicitation effect 
on the overall amount of giving is 9.7 percent (s.e. = 1.6 percent), which is comparable to the 
equivalent effect in Column (3) of Table 1, 10.2 percent. It therefore seems that this assumption 
is unlikely to be driving our results. 
  4.1 Basic Model 
We begin by examining the effect of peer solicitation on giving throughout the entire 
year. As discussed above, solicitors may be causing their friends to give, through direct requests 
or indirect discussions about volunteering, even before the personal solicitations begin in June. 
Moreover, if it is simply shared experience that drives giving, we would expect to see a peer so-
licitation effect throughout the entire year. Figure 1 plots the solicitor roommate effect on the 
probability of giving in month t, conditional on not having given prior to that month. It is evident 
that the giving effect spikes in June; this provides further evidence that the peer solicitation ef-
fect is not spurious.  16 
 
We  therefore focus on June,  the  month  in  which nearly all  personal solicitations  are 
made, whether by a peer or a stranger. The results in Column (1) of Table 2 show the results for 
the probability of making a gift, as in Equation (1) above. In addition to the variables listed, the 
model includes the other covariates mentioned in Section 3 and described in Table A1, along 
with year, class, and location effects; these coefficients are not reported for brevity.
10 The peer 
solicitation effect is positive and significant; having a freshman roommate who is a solicitor in a 
given year is associated with a 2.2 percentage point higher probability of giving in June. Off of a 
baseline of approximately 26 percent, this is a fairly large effect. Taken together with the size of 
the effect during the rest of the year, shown in Figure 1, we feel confident that this result is not 
due to shared experience. Further, the other, non-solicitation aspects of volunteering are small 
and insignificant. This is also consistent with the notion that peer solicitation exerts a substantial 
effect on the decision to make a gift and that our results are not driven by shared experience. The 
results in Column (2) show the effect on the log amount of giving, conditional on making a gift. 
The coefficients are neither statistically significant nor are they particularly large, indicating that 
there does not seem to be much of an effect on the size of the gift, conditional on making one; 
this is consistent with models in which the mere act of making a gift alleviates the social pres-
sure, but making a larger gift has no effect. Using the results from Equations (1) and (2) to calcu-
late the marginal effect on mean giving yields the effect on the average size of a gift for each 
alumnus. We see in Column (3) that the peer solicitation has a positive and significant effect of 
10.2 percent (s.e. = 2.7 percent) on the average gift. The other aspects of volunteering are still 
insignificant and relatively small, so we conclude that peer solicitation has a strong and direct 
effect on both the probability of giving and the average gift. 
                                                 
10 The full results are provided in Table A2. 17 
 
It  is  important  to  note,  though,  that  if  we  view  the  solicitor  roommate  variable  as 
representing peer effects in charitable solicitation, there are two ways in which it can be misclas-
sified. First, there may be a false positive, in which the individual was not actually solicited by 
the listed roommate. Second, there may be a false negative, in which a person without a solicitor 
roommate was solicited by a friend with some other relationship. The reference group is those 
who do not have a freshman roommate who is now a solicitor, which is composed of a mix of 
those who are familiar with their solicitor in some other way and those who do not know the so-
licitor at all. If the effect of being solicited by a familiar person for those in the false positive 
case above is greater than zero,
11 this will bias the measured effect downward. The same is true 
for the false negative effect, assuming that the peer solicitor effect in those cases is positive as 
well. This suggests that the true effect of being solicited by a familiar person is larger. Given suf-
ficiently strong assumptions, it is possible to place an upper bound on this effect, even without 
instrumental variables. Frazis and Loewenstein [2003] present formulas for finding the upper 
bounds on binary variables with misclassification; however, these formulas require that the mis-
classification error be uncorrelated with both the alumnus’s exogenous characteristics and the 
alumnus’s unobserved error. These strict conditions that seem unlikely to hold in this case – for 
instance, it would require that the probability that an alumnus is solicited by a friend be uncorre-
lated with their participation in activities such as varsity athletics or their choice of major.
12  
   
 
                                                 
11 It may be, however, that the solicitor deliberately does not contact a former roommate if they have a poor relation-
ship. In that case, the solicitor effect for those interactions may be zero or even negative; however, since we are in-
terested in the effect of being solicited by a person with whom one has a positive relationship, this is not a concern. 
12 Abstracting from these issues, and ssuming a false positive probability, conditional on having a solicitor rooom-
mate, of 0.3 and a false negative probability, conditional on not having a solicitor roommate, of 0.3 (this latter num-
ber is based on discussions with a number of Anon U solicitors), the upper bound on the effect of peer solicitation 
on the probability of making a gift is 2.0 times the estimated coefficient. The upper bound on the effect of a solicitor 
roommate on the amount of the gift, conditional on making one, is 2.7 times the estimated coefficient. 18 
 
4.2 Fixed Effects 
While our model controls for a large number of potentially confounding variables, it is 
still possible that unobserved heterogeneity is driving our results. For example, our covariates 
may not fully capture permanent income, affinity for Anon U, or shared experience. In order to 
better account for these effects, we estimate our model including individual fixed effects in an 
ordinary least squares framework. Transitions into and out of volunteering by the solicitors en-
sures that individuals’ giving histories contain a mix of years in which their roommates were and 
were not solicitors. The results are reported in Table 3. These estimates capture all of the alum-
nus’s time-invariant attributes, including any freshman-room-level effects. Therefore, if our re-
sults are actually driven by correlated effects and common shocks to freshman year roommates, 
the solicitor effect should disappear.  
Since estimating a fixed-effects probit is cumbersome, Column (1) uses a linear probabil-
ity model with fixed effects for the probability of making a gift in June; Column (2) estimates 
ordinary least squares with fixed effects for the amount of the gift, conditional on making one. 
The results are consistent with the findings discussed in Section 4.1. The effect of having a 
roommate who is currently a solicitor is still positive and significant, though smaller than in the 
basic model; the probability of making a gift increases by 1.3 percentage points (s.e. = 0.44 per-
centage points).
13 The effect is about two-thirds the size of the one in Section 4.1, though an in-
crease of about 5 percent in participation is not inconsiderable. The other aspects of volunteering 
are extremely small and insignificant; for instance, the effect of having a roommate who is cur-
rently a reunion volunteer decreases the probability of giving by 0.056 percentage points (s.e. = 
                                                 
13 For a more direct comparison, we also estimated the model in Equation (1) of Section 4 by ordinary least squares. 
The result is similar to that in Section 4.1, with a solicitor effect of 2.1 percentage (s.e. = 0.55 percentage points). 
Only eight observations out of nearly 140,000 have a predicted probability less than zero; none are greater than one. 19 
 
1.1 percentage points).
14 The results in Column (2) are also similar to those in Section 4.1. There 
appears to be no effect on the intensive margin of having a roommate who is currently a solicitor. 
Finally, Column (3) combines the estimates and reports marginal effects on the average gift; 
again, while the effect (6.4 percent, s.e. = 1.7 percent) is somewhat smaller than that in Table 1, 
it is still relatively large, statistically significant, and much larger than the effect of the other as-
pects of volunteering. On the basis of these results, it would be difficult to argue that unobserved 
heterogeneity is driving our results. Further, taking these results in conjunction with those in Sec-
tion 4.1, we feel confident that the effects measured by the solicitor roommate variable in June 
represent peer solicitation. 
  4.3 Shared Characteristics 
An important question is whether there are certain characteristics shared by the solicitor 
and the potential donor that change the effectiveness of solicitation. To that end, we create a se-
ries of variables which equal one if the solicitor and the individual do not share that attribute.
15 
Again, we do not know for certain whether solicitation actually occurred when an individual’s 
roommate is now a solicitor, just that it is likely to have happened. We focus on race, as defined 
in Table A1, along with whether the individuals were athletes, whether they joined one of Anon 
U’s fraternities or sororities, and whether they received academic honors.
16 It is important to note 
that these latter two attributes are realized after these individuals lived together. Students at Anon 
U do not join a social organization until their sophomore year, and, of course, academic honors 
                                                 
14 Another possible approach is to estimate a probit including the mean for the individual of each covariate as addi-
tional controls. Using the June sample, the marginal effect for the solicitor roommate variable in this model is quite 
close to that from the linear probability model with fixed effects – 1.33 percentage points (s.e. = 0.52 percentage 
points); the coefficients on other variables are similarly close in magnitude. 
15 In the few cases in which a suite has more that one solicitor, the average of their characteristics is taken. 
16 Summary statistics for these variables are available in Table A1. Approximately 25% of the solicitor-roommate 
observations are associated with different-race matches, along with 34% of the observations being different social 
club matches, 47% being different academic matches, and 44% being different athletic matches. Approximately 
17% of the solicitor-roommate observations are matched on all four characteristics. 20 
 
are not received until graduation.
17 In essence, then, these variables serve as proxies for attitudes 
towards socializing and academics. The results, shown in Table 4, are striking. If the solicitor 
and his or her former roommate share all four characteristics, the effect on the probability of giv-
ing is 4.8 percentage points, more than twice as large as the effect in Section 4.1. But if the two 
are of different races, the effect on the probability of making a gift is significantly lower – to the 
point that the combined effect is insignificantly different than zero (p = 0.176). Different social 
club status has a smaller effect that is significant only at the 0.129 level, and different academic 
honors is significant at the 0.091 level; the coefficients are large, representing about a third of the 
main effect, though the combined effect is still significantly different from zero. Different athlet-
ic status does not seem to have an effect and is relatively small.  
The results are also striking for the amount of the gift, conditional on giving. Column (2) 
shows that the mean gift conditional on giving for those who have a roommate who is a solicitor 
is 17.5 percent higher (s.e. = 5.8 percent) than for those who do not, – but only if both the indi-
vidual and the solicitor are matched in the four characteristics. The race mismatch effect is nega-
tive, significant, and of the same magnitude as the main effect. Different athletic and social club 
status do not significantly reduce the main effect, though the coefficients are relatively large, 
about a third of the size of the main effect, albeit with large standard errors.  
Column (3), in turn, shows the results on the overall amount of giving. The peer solicita-
tion effect for individuals who are fully matched is quite large, 24.4 percent (s.e. = 5.2 percent). 
Mismatches on race (-13.9 percent, s.e. = 4.9), social club (-8.3 percent, s.e. = 4.8 percent), and 
academic honors (-9.1 percent, s.e. = 4.3 percent) cut down peer solicitation effect dramatically. 
However, only the race mismatch reduces the solicitor effect to one that is insignificantly differ-
                                                 
17 Redefining the academic mismatch using the admissions office’s academic rating, which is defined prior to arrival 
at Anon U, yields very similar results. 21 
 
ent from zero. Adding several mismatch effects to the main effect can yield a prediction that is 
negative and significantly different from zero. This may occur because donors feel obligated to 
give when called by a former roommate with whom they have little in common, but they give a 
very small amount; however, it is difficult to be certain of the means through which this effect 
arises. These findings seem consistent with the findings from the psychology literature men-
tioned previously, that individuals are more likely to donate when asked by those who are similar 
to them. Or perhaps roommates who have similar attributes form a closer relationship; if mis-
matched individuals are not friends at all, the solicitor may not even contact the individual. Then 
the observed result is explained by a lack of solicitation, not ineffective solicitation. Alternative-
ly, a closer relationship allows the solicitor to apply more pressure years later.  
Observing the overall effect of these mismatches is quite interesting. But it is also inter-
esting to hold the alumnus’s unobservable attitudes fixed – covariates for race, academic honors, 
social club, and athletics will account for some of these time-invariant attitudes, but fixed effects 
should control for them entirely. These specifications control for the experience of living in that 
particular freshman year room, including the formation of friendships. The results including do-
nor fixed effects, shown in Table 5, differ from those in Table 4 in several important ways. For 
the decision of whether or not to make a gift, using a linear probability model, the solicitor 
roommate effect for those who are matched on all four dimensions is still positive and significant 
(2.4 percentage points, s.e = 0.80 percentage points), but the race mismatch is very small and in-
significant (-0.25 percentage points, s.e. = 1.0 percentage points). The athlete mismatch is simi-
larly small, while mismatches in social club status are relatively large (-1.7 percentage points, 
s.e. = 0.90 percentage points), as are mismatches in academic honors (-1.3 percentage points, s.e. 
= 0.86 percentage points). For the size of the gift, conditional on giving, the fully-matched effect 22 
 
is still large and significant (9.7 percent, s.e. = 4.6 percent). Race mismatches are, as for the ex-
tensive margin, relatively small and insignificant (-3.5 percent, s.e. = 5.8 percent). However, un-
like the extensive margin, athlete mismatches are sizable, though statistically insignificant (-5.9 
percent, s.e. = 4.8 percent) and social club mismatches are small and insignificant (0.10 percent, 
s.e. = 5.5 percent). Academic honors mismatches have the largest effect (-9.1 percent, s.e. = 4.9 
percent). Turning to the effects on the average size of the gift, we see that race (-2.0 percent, s.e. 
= 3.8 percent) and athletic mismatches (0.24 percent, s.e. = 3.3 percent) are small and insignifi-
cant, while social club (-7.7 percent, s.e. = 3.4 percent) and academic honors mismatches (-8.3 
percent, s.e. = 3.3 percent) are large and statistically significant. The difference in the race mis-
match between the estimates with and without fixed effects indicates that the race mismatch ef-
fect is due to something about the experience of having a freshman year roommate of a different 
race. This seems to imply that friendship is less likely to form or forms less strongly between in-
dividuals of different race, but conditional on the level of friendship, there is no difference in the 
peer solicitor’s influence. On the other hand, since the social and academic mismatches are still 
present after controlling for that freshman year experience, those aspects seem to operate on a 
different dimension. Even conditioning on a certain level of friendship formation, the solicitor is 
less able to influence his or her former roommate years later.  
  4.4 Gender 
  There  is  extensive  evidence  that  men  and  women  approach  philanthropy  in  different 
ways. (see, for example, Andreoni and Vesterlund [2001] and Meer and Rosen [2008]). While 
there are no mixed-gender rooms, which makes it impossible to examine reactions to solicitation 
by a peer of a different gender, we can examine whether men or women are more sensitive to 
peer solicitation. To investigate these differences, we re-estimate the models from Table 1 in-23 
 
cluding an interaction term between the male indicator and the solicitor roommate indicator. The 
results, reported in Table 6, show a negligible gender effect. The additional effect of the interac-
tion term is just 0.4 percentage points (s.e. = 1.2 percentage points). Examining the intensive 
margin, the effect for women is 2.6 percent (s.e. = 5.2 percent), while the effect for men is 5.0 
percent (s.e. = 4.3 percent). While the relative difference between the two is fairly large, it is in-
significant, as shown by the coefficient on the indicator. These results carry through to Column 
(3), which shows an insignificant difference between the genders on the incremental effect of 
peer solicitation. 
  To compare how shared characteristics, as in Section 4.3, affect each gender, we re-
estimate the model interacting the mismatch indicators with the gender dummy. The results are 
reported in Table 7. For the decision of whether to make a gift, the effect of having a solicitor 
roommate  who  shares similar  characteristics for  women  is  quite large,  about  5.5  percentage 
points (s.e. = 1.8 percentage points). It is slightly smaller for men, though the difference is not 
statistically significant. Turning to the mismatch variables, different race seems to be more im-
portant for women than for men, with the effect for women being large and significant: -3.6 per-
centage points (s.e. = 1.4 percentage points). Summing the main effect, gender interactions, and 
race mismatch variables for men, we find a smaller effect (-1.5 percentage points, s.e. = 1.5 per-
centage points) that is insignificantly different from zero. For women, the effect a mismatch on 
academic honors status is statistically significant and fairly large (-2.4 percentage points, s.e. = 
1.4 percentage points), while for men, the effect of a mismatch on social club status is signifi-
cantly different from zero at p = 0.11 (-2.0 percentage points, s.e = 1.2 percentage points). It is 
apparent  that  shared  characteristics  affect  the  solicitor’s  ability  to  influence  the  decision  of 24 
 
whether or not to give – though, as stated in Section 4.3, the precise causes of this relationship 
are unclear.  
There are some interesting effects on the amount of the gift, conditional on giving. It 
seems that the large negative social club mismatch effect is limited to men; conversely, the large 
negative academic mismatch effect is limited to women, as is the race mismatch effect. While it 
is statistically insignificant, there is a fairly large negative athletic mismatch effect that is also 
limited to men. Without making too much of it, it does seem that men and women react diffe-
rently to different characteristics.  
  The  effects  are  somewhat  clearer  for  the  overall  amount  of  the  gift,  in  Column  (3), 
though they vary widely and are, for the most part, imprecisely estimated. Having a solicitor 
roommate who is fully matched on these characteristics increases an alumna’s giving by 27.0 
percent (s.e. = 8.6 percent); the difference with a fully matched alumnus is not statistically signif-
icant. For both men and women, having a race mismatch reduces giving by a large amount, equal 
or greater to the effect for being fully matched. For women, the other shared characteristics that 
seem to matter most are academic honors status, while for men, shared fraternity and athletic sta-
tus exert the largest effects. It is important to note, though, that the standard errors on most of 
these mismatch variables are relatively large.  
  To summarize, both genders are far more likely to donate a larger gift in a given year if 
they are solicited by a former roommate with whom they share all four of the characteristics in-
cluded in Table 5. However, men seem more responsive to a former roommate who shares their 
attitudes on socializing, while women seem more responsive to a former roommate who shares 
their attitudes towards academics, at least as proxied by the variables described above. Ultimate-
ly, though, it is difficult to speculate as to the underlying causes of these gender differences. 25 
 
  4.5 Geographical Proximity 
It may be that solicitor roommates are more able to apply their influence if they live close 
to  their  former  roommate;  then  again,  modern  telecommunications  means  that  geographical 
closeness may not be relevant at all. We create a term that equals 1 if the alumnus has a room-
mate who is a solicitor and lives in the same area, as defined by the first two digits of their ZIP 
codes.
18 Alumni listed as living abroad are dropped, leaving 131,828 potential gift opportunities, 
of which 34,380 are taken.  
Only 7.1 percent of those with a solicitor roommate live in the same two-digit ZIP code 
area as that roommate; this small number is probably responsible for the imprecision on the 
match coefficients seen in Table 8. For both the probability of making a gift and the amount giv-
en, conditional on giving, the match coefficient is similar in size to the main effect, though it is 
negative – a finding that contradicts the hypothesis that roommates who live relatively closer 
may be better able to apply their influence. We also repeated this exercise with geographic prox-
imity defined by state or foreign country; while there are more matches in this situation, the re-
sults are quite imprecise as well. It is difficult to draw conclusions, therefore, about the effects of 
geographic proximity.
19  
  4.6 Solicitor’s Giving 
The amount given by the solicitor him- or herself may affect the alumnus’s gift in several 
ways.
20 First, it may proxy for the solicitor’s own affinity, thus providing an additional control 
for shared experience. It may further signify the intensity and energy he or she brings to the 
                                                 
18 The first two digits of a ZIP code cover a broad area (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:ZIP_Code_zones.svg 
for a map). Using more precise measures, though, led to a negligible number of matches. 
19 Information about geographic region of origin is not available for all classes. We use this limited sample, with 
44,089 observations (10,661 associated with a gift), and define a region of origin match in a variety of ways, but no 
significant or consistent results emerged from the exercise. 
20 The mean gift associated with a solicitor roommate, conditional on having one, is $5420, with a median of $223. 
Note that multiple individuals with the same solicitor roommate will have the same value for that solicitor’s gift. 26 
 
process. Second, given the literature on social comparisons, the solicitor may point to his or her 
own gift as an example. This second possibility seems less likely, given that many potential do-
nors may view discussing the solicitor’s own gift as uncouth.  
In any case, the effect, shown in Table 9, is tiny. Including the solicitor’s giving (in dol-
lars) and its quadratic yields infinitesimally small coefficients. For example, the marginal effect 
of solicitor’s giving on the probability of giving, evaluated at the mean, is about -9.58x10
-8; the 
effect on the intensive margin is similarly small and insignificant – about 1.24x10
-6. The effect 
on overall giving is about -1.8x10
-7, implying that implies that an increase of about $50,000 in 
the size of the solicitor’s gift is associated with a decrease of 1 percent in the donor’s gift. It is 




Using a unique data set on alumni donations to a selective research university, we have 
estimated the effect of personal solicitation on charitable donations. Our data allow us to account 
for self-selection into groups, shared experiences, and a host of other potentially confounding 
factors, leaving only the incremental effect of being asked to give by an acquaintance rather than 
a stranger. We find that this effect is fairly strong, confirming the intuition of professional fun-
draisers and providing evidence for peer pressure effects. Personal solicitation has an effect on 
both the decision to make a gift and the average size of the gift, with our estimates likely to be a 
lower bound. However, matches between the solicitor and his or her former roommate on several 
dimensions exert a strong influence on the effect of personal solicitation. When the alumnus and 
the solicitor are matched on these dimensions, the peer solicitation effect is much larger; howev-
er, mismatches reduce this effect substantially. The means by which those solicitors with closer 27 
 
matches to their former roommates are better able to influence these donors is unclear, but it is 
evident that similarity between the solicitor and the donor is quite important. 
A further question is whether it is worthwhile to arrange for personal solicitation when-
ever possible. More than 92 percent of the sample does not have a solicitor roommate, and these 
alumni have a mean gift of $153, including nongivers. It is difficult to put an exact figure on the 
potential increase in gifts, since, as discussed in Section 4.1, misclassification error means that 
estimate is a lower bound; moreover, the existence of false negatives means that some alumni are 
already receiving personal solicitation. Further, those who choose to be solicitors are likely to be 
more effective than those who do not, so enlisting more solicitors may not yield the same quality 
of solicitation. But with about 10,000 giving opportunities per year, it seems evident that a shift 
to personal solicitation could increase the university’s fundraising substantially. Whether that is a 
worthwhile use of resources depends on amount of time and effort it would take to link each 
alumnus with a solicitor he or she knows. Every individual is already contacted. Excluding the 
time spent linking alumni and solicitors, there would not be an increase in the overall amount of 
time spent – merely a shift of the burden to new solicitors who are familiar with alumni currently 
contacted by a stranger. Given the large sums at stake, it seems that the effort involved in making 
sure that each alumnus is solicited by an acquaintance seems worthwhile. This is particularly true 
if there is habit forming in giving; there is some evidence to suggest that is the case (see Meer 
[2009]). Intense efforts to use peers to solicit individuals will therefore have larger long-term ef-
fects. 
In a larger context, this paper provides evidence that some behaviors are driven by social 
motives – specifically, social pressure. This outcome emphasizes the importance of accounting 
for these motives in studies of charitable giving. Further, leveraging such social influences can 28 
 
affect the allocation of public goods – to the extent that personal solicitation applies pressure and 
distorts decisions, donations may be misdirected. 
The results are also informative for fundraisers, who may want to modify their solicita-
tion strategy so that solicitors focus on the people who are most like them. There are implications 
for the distribution of solicitor effort; if the primary effect is on the extensive margin, lower-
intensity solicitation of more people may result in more gifts. Alternatively, fundraisers may 
choose to focus their efforts on large givers, for whom additional solicitation intensity is much 
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Each column shows the respective summary statistic for individuals who ever served as each volunteer type, in years 
in which individuals did not serve as that volunteer type. For comparison, summary statistics for those who never 
volunteered in any capacity are listed as well. Standard deviations, where appropriate, are listed in parentheses. 
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Column (1) shows the incremental effects on the probability of making a gift in a given year, based on a probit mod-
el and using 139,869 observations. Column (2) shows the incremental effects on the amount of the gift, conditional 
on making gift, using ordinary least squares and using observations with a positive gift in the month of June, a total 
of 36,039 observations. Column (3) combines these, and shows the marginal effects on total giving. The figures in 
parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level are marked with **; 
those significant at the 10% level are marked with *. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering based on individu-
als. In addition to the variables listed, the regressions include year, location, and class effects, as well as a constant, 
which are not reported for brevity. Full results are available in Table A2. 36 
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Column (1) shows the incremental effects on the probability of making a gift in a given year, OLS with fixed effects 
and using 139,869 observations. Column (2) shows the incremental effects on the amount of the gift, conditional on 
making gift, using OLS with fixed effects and using observations with a positive gift in the month of June, a total of 
36,039 observations. Column (3) combines these, and shows the marginal effects on total giving. The figures in pa-
rentheses are standard errors. Coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level are marked with **; those 
significant at the 10% level are marked with *. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering based on individuals. In 
addition to the variables listed, the regressions include years since graduation and its quadratic, an indicator for reu-
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Column (1) shows the incremental effects on the probability of making a gift in June of a given year, based on a 
probit model. These results are based on 139,869 observations on gift-giving in June from 1992 to 2007. Column (2) 
shows the incremental effects on the amount of the gift made in June, conditional on making gift, using ordinary 
least squares, based on 36,039 observations on gifts made from 1992 to 2007. Column (3) combines these, and 
shows the marginal effects on total giving. The first row shows the effect of having a solicitor roommate in a given 
year, conditional on being matched on the four characteristics shown in the last four rows. Each of those four rows 
shows the effect on being mismatched on that attribute, but no other. The figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
Coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level are marked with **; those significant at the 10% level 
are marked with *. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering based on individuals. In addition to the variables 
listed, the regressions include the covariates listed in the Appendix, as well as year, location, and class effects, which 
are not reported for brevity. Full results are available upon request. 38 
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Shared Characteristics with Donor Fixed Effects 
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Column (1) shows the incremental effects on the probability of making a gift in a given year, OLS with fixed effects 
and using 139,869 observations. Column (2) shows the incremental effects on the amount of the gift, conditional on 
making gift, using OLS with fixed effects and using observations with a positive gift in the month of June, a total of 
36,039 observations. Column (3) combines these, and shows the marginal effects on total giving. The first row 
shows the effect of having a solicitor roommate in a given year, conditional on being matched on the four characte-
ristics shown in the last four rows. Each of those four rows shows the effect on being mismatched on that attribute, 
but no other. The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% 
level are marked with **; those significant at the 10% level are marked with *. Standard errors are adjusted for clus-
tering based on individuals. In addition to the variables listed, the regressions include years since graduation and its 
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Column (1) shows the incremental effects on the probability of making a gift in June of a given year, based on a 
probit model. These results are based on 139,869 observations on gift-giving in June from 1992 to 2007. Column (2) 
shows the incremental effects on the amount of the gift made in June, conditional on making gift, using ordinary 
least squares, based on 36,039 observations on gifts made from 1992 to 2007. Column (3) combines these, and 
shows the marginal effects on total giving. The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients that are statis-
tically significant at the 5% level are marked with **; those significant at the 10% level are marked with *. Standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering based on individuals. In addition to the variables listed, the regressions include the 
covariates listed in the Appendix, as well as year, location, and class effects, which are not reported for brevity. Full 
results are available upon request. 40 
 
Table 7 
Gender and Shared Characteristics 
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Column (1) shows the incremental effects on the probability of making a gift in June of a given year, based on a probit 
model. These results are based on 139,869 observations on gift-giving in June from 1992 to 2007. Column (2) shows the 
incremental effects on the amount of the gift made in June, conditional on making gift, using ordinary least squares, based 
on 36,039 observations on gifts made from 1992 to 2007. Column (3) combines these, and shows the marginal effects on 
total giving. The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level are 
marked with **; those significant at the 10% level are marked with *. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering based on 
individuals. In addition to the variables listed, the regressions include the covariates listed in the Appendix, as well as year, 





  (1) 
Probability  




Log Amount of Gift  
Conditional on Giving 
 
Ordinary Least Squares 
(3) 
Total Effect on Giving 






Roommate is a solicitor and lives in 
































Column (1) shows the incremental effects on the probability of making a gift in June of a given year, based on a 
probit model. These results are based on 131,828 observations on gift-giving in June from 1992 to 2007. Column (2) 
shows the incremental effects on the amount of the gift made in June, conditional on making gift, using ordinary 
least squares, based on 34,380 observations on gifts made from 1992 to 2007. Column (3) combines these, and 
shows the marginal effects on total giving. The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients that are statis-
tically significant at the 5% level are marked with **; those significant at the 10% level are marked with *. Standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering based on individuals. In addition to the variables listed, the regressions include the 
covariates listed in the Appendix, as well as year, location, and class effects, which are not reported for brevity. Full 
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Column (1) shows the incremental effects on the probability of making a gift in June of a given year, based on a 
probit model. These results are based on 139,869 observations on gift-giving in June from 1992 to 2007. Column (2) 
shows the incremental effects on the amount of the gift made in June, conditional on making gift, using ordinary 
least squares, based on 36,039 observations on gifts made from 1992 to 2007. Column (3) combines these, and 
shows the marginal effects on total giving. The figures in parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients that are statis-
tically significant at the 5% level are marked with **; those significant at the 10% level are marked with *. Standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering based on individuals. In addition to the variables listed, the regressions include the 
covariates listed in the Appendix, as well as year, location, and class effects, which are not reported for brevity. Full 






Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Variable  Description  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
TotalYear  Total giving for year (2007 dollars) conditional on making a gift  614.62  7807.94 
LogTotalYear  Log of giving for year (2007 dollars) conditional on making a gift  4.51  1.50 
Didgive  1 if any donation given in year  0.258  0.437 
RoomSolicitor  1 if any freshman year roommate is a solicitor in year t  0.0767  0.266 
RoomReunion  1 if any freshman year roommate is a reunion volunteer in year t  0.0081  0.0896 
RoomUniversity  1 if any freshman year roommate is a university volunteer in year t  0.0586  0.235 
RoomRegional  1 if any freshman year roommate is a regional volunteer in year t  0.0982  0.298 
NoMatchRace
**  1 if the individual and the freshman year roommate, a solicitor in 
year t, are of different race   0.0184  0.134 
NoMatchSocial
**  1 if the individual and the freshman year roommate, a solicitor in 
year t, have different fraternity/sorority status  0.0261  0.158 
NoMatchAcademic
**  1 if the individual and the freshman year roommate, a solicitor in 
year t, have different academic honors status  0.0360  0.184 
NoMatchAthletic
**  1 if the individual and the freshman year roommate, a solicitor in 
year t, have different athletic status  0.0336  0.178 
Yearssince  Number of years since graduation  14.46  7.96 
Yearssince2  Number of years since graduation, squared  272.62  252.46 
Spouseisalum  1 if the spouse is an alumnus  0.104  0.305 
Male  1 if the alumnus is male  0.662  0.473 
Race/Ethnicity 
 
White  Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus is White  0.799  0.401 
Amerind  1 if the alumnus is a Native American  0.00372  0.0609 
Black  1 if the alumnus is Black  0.0766  0.266 
Hispanic  1 if the alumnus is Hispanic  0.0444  0.206 
Asian  1 if the alumnus is Asian  0.0767  0.266 






Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus attended public school  0.587  0.492 
Boarding  1 if the alumnus attended boarding school  0.132  0.339 
Private  1 if the alumnus attended private school  0.264  0.441 
School - Other  1 if the alumnus attended another type of school  0.0161  0.126 
SATmath  SAT math score. Scores prior to 1996 are adjusted to reflect re-
centering of the scoring scale. 
702  76.4 
SATverbal  SAT verbal score. Scores prior to 1996 are adjusted to reflect 
recentering of the scoring scale. 






Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus received the highest non-
academic ranking from the admissions office  0.0288  0.167 
B  1 if the alumnus received the second highest non-academic ranking 
from the admissions office 
0.485  0.500 
C  1 if the alumnus received the third highest non-academic ranking 
from the admissions office 
0.410  0.492 
D  1 if the alumnus received the fourth highest non-academic ranking 
from the admissions office 
0.0721  0.259 
E  1 if the alumnus received the fifth highest non-academic ranking 
from the admissions office 





Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus received the highest academic 
ranking from the admissions office  0.151  0.358 
B  1 if the alumnus received the second highest academic ranking 
from the admissions office 
0.415  0.493 
C  1 if the alumnus received the third highest academic ranking from 
the admissions office 
0.277  0.448 
D  1 if the alumnus received the fourth highest academic ranking from 
the admissions office 
0.150  0.357 
E  1 if the alumnus received the fifth highest academic ranking from 
the admissions office 
0.0063  0.0792 
Clubsport  1 if the alumnus played on a club team  0.126  0.331 
Honors  1 if the alumnus graduated magna, summa, or cum laude  0.433  0.496 
Greek  1 if the alumnus was a member of a fraternity or sorority  0.688  0.463 




Molbio  Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus majored in molecular biology  0.0254  0.157 
Small Social Science  1 if the alumnus majored in Anthropology, Urban Studies, or  
Sociology. 
0.0285  0.167 
English  1 if the alumnus majored in English  0.114  0.318 
Economics  1 if the alumnus majored in Economics  0.0769  0.266 
Public Policy  1 if the alumnus majored in Public Policy  0.0583  0.234 
Political Science  1 if the alumnus majored in Political Science  0.0898  0.286 
Psychology  1 if the alumnus majored in Psychology  0.0476  0.213 
History  1 if the alumnus majored in History  0.120  0.325 
MAE  1 if the alumnus majored in Mechanical/Aerospace Engineering  0.0353  0.184 
EE/CS  1 if the alumnus majored in Electrical Engineering or Computer 
Science 
0.0584  0.234 
Arch & Civ  1 if the alumnus majored in Architecture or Civil Engineering  0.0673  0.251 
Small Humanities 
1 if the alumnus majored in Art, Art History, Classics, East Asian 
Studies, Linguistics, Music, Near Eastern Studies, Philosophy, 
Religion, or Languages and Literature departments  
0.113  0.317 
Small Engineering  1 if the alumnus majored in “Engineering”, Operations Research 
and Financial Engineering, or Chemical Engineering 
0.0301  0.171 
Small Sciences 
1 if the alumnus majored in Applied Mathematics, Astrophysics, 
Biochemistry, Biology, Chemistry, Ecology and Evolutionary 
Biology, Geology, Mathematics, Physics, or Statistics 
0.135  0.342 
Minor  
 
No Minor  Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus received no minor  0.774  0.418 
African/African-
American Studies 
1 if the alumnus received a minor in African or African-American 
Studies 
0.0247  0.155 
American Studies  1 if the alumnus received a minor in American Studies  0.0231  0.150 
Latin  1 if the alumnus received a minor in Latin  0.0023  0.0476 
Finance  1 if the alumnus received a minor in Finance  0.00423  0.0649 
Theater  1 if the alumnus received a minor in Theater  0.0143  0.119 
Public Policy  1 if the alumnus received a minor in Public Policy  0.0506  0.219 
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Other Engineering 
1 if the alumnus received a minor in Architecture, Basic Engineer-
ing, Bioengineering, Electrical Engineering, Geological Engineer-
ing, Management, Materials Sciences, or Robotics. 
0.0180  0.133 
Other Sciences 
1 if the alumnus received a minor in Applied and Computational 
Mathematics, Biophysics, Cognitive Studies, Environmental Stu-
dies, Science in Human Affairs, or Neuroscience. 
0.0263  0.160 
Other Humanities  1 if the alumnus received a minor in a humanities field  0.0563  0.230 
Teaching  1 if the alumnus received a teaching certificate  0.0195  0.138 
Reunion  1 if the year after graduation is some multiple of 5  0.181  0.385 
Magazine  1 if the alumnus receives the alumni magazine  0.951  0.216 
AC Mailable  1 if the alumnus permits mailings from the alumni council  0.983  0.129 
AG Mailable  1 if the alumnus permits mailings from alumni giving  0.551  0.497 
AG Phonable  1 if the alumnus permits phone calls from alumni giving  0.892  0.311 
No Solicit  1 if the alumnus is on a no-solicit list  0.0693  0.254 
Reduce Solicit  1 if the alumnus is on a reduced solicitation list  0.322  0.467 
SP Participant  1 if the alumnus was a participant in the senior class gift  0.410  0.492 
No Dues  1 if the alumnus has never paid class dues  0.371  0.483 




No Advanced  Omitted Category: 1 if the alumnus has no advanced degree  0.663  0.473 
PhD  1 if the alumnus has a Ph.D. or equivalent degree  0.0593  0.236 
Masters  1 if the alumnus has a masters  0.120  0.325 
JD  1 if the alumnus has a JD  0.0878  0.283 
MD/DDS  1 if the alumnus has a medical degree  0.0500  0.212 
MBA  1 if the alumnus has an MBA  0.0726  0.259 
 
*Figures are based on 139,869 observations on gift-giving in June from 1992 to 2007. 18,060 alumni who graduated 
from 1972 to 2005, excluding the classes of 1993, 1994, and 1996, are represented.  
**A small number of individuals have multiple former roommates who are now solicitors in a given year. The aver-
age of the solicitors’ characteristics are taken and interacted with the individual’s characteristic.  47 
 
Table A2 









Log Amount of Gift 




Total Effect on Giving 
Yearssince  0.00834** 
(0.00111)   
0.161** 
(0.00641)   
0.0651** 
(0.00492) 
Yearssince2  -0.0000518* 
(0.0000266)   
-0.00303** 
(0.000153)   
-0.00078** 
(0.000118) 
Spouseisalum  0.0772** 
(0.00777)   
-0.126** 
(0.0378)   
0.298** 
(0.0356) 
Male  -0.00898** 
(0.00442)   
0.120** 








(0.0294)   
-0.360   
(0.273)   
0.0279 
(0.125) 
Black  -0.0210** 
(0.00875)   
-0.193** 
(0.0546)   
-0.121** 
(0.0382) 
Hispanic  -0.0408** 
(0.00907)   
-0.186** 
(0.0634)   
-0.201** 
(0.0399) 
Asian  -0.0136* 
(0.00726)   
0.0161   













Private  0.00522   
(0.00455)   
0.0856** 
(0.0279)   
0.0382* 
(0.0213) 
School - Other  -0.0279** 
(0.0138)   
-0.255** 
(0.112)   
-0.159** 
(0.0595) 
SATmath  0.0000546   
(0.0000722)   
-0.0000227   
(0.000399)   
0.000228 
(0.00326) 
SATverbal  -0.0000125   
(0.0000745)   
-0.000154   
(0.000435)   
-0.000082 
(0.00339) 
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0.0152   
(0.0119)   
-0.0137   
(0.0836)   
0.0618 
(0.0568) 
C  0.0138 
(0.0124)   
0.0215   
(0.0860)   
0.0627 
(0.0590) 
D  -0.00296   
(0.0142)   
0.0428   
(0.0973)   
-0.00485 
(0.0666) 
E  0.00371   
(0.0302)   
-0.0476   









(0.00654)   
0.116** 
(0.0394)   
0.0781** 
(0.0311) 
C  0.0146* 
(0.00879)   
0.256** 
(0.0551)   
0.111** 
(0.0431) 
D  0.00562   
(0.0114)   
0.293** 
(0.0751)   
0.0789 
(0.0559) 
E  -0.0262   
(0.0234)   
0.510** 
(0.161)   
-0.0313 
(0.118) 
GPA – Bottom  
Quartile 
-0.00205   
(0.00836)   
-0.200** 
(0.0549)   
-0.0453 
(0.0373) 
GPA – Second  
Quartile 
-0.0000359   
(0.00715)   
-0.100** 
(0.0460)   
-0.0186 
(0.0324) 
GPA – Third  
Quartile 
0.00816   
(0.00598)   
-0.0702* 
(0.0362)   
0.0215 
(0.0273) 
Clubsport  -0.00240   
(0.00582)   
0.0350   
(0.0371)   
-0.00385 
(0.0269) 
Honors  -0.00806   
(0.00542)   
-0.0130   
(0.0362)   
-0.0367 
(0.0248) 
Greek  0.0335** 
(0.00428)   
0.127** 
(0.0286)   
0.164** 
(0.0216) 
Athlete  0.00573   
(0.00464)   
0.0160   
(0.0294)   
0.0274 
(0.0216) 




Small Social Science 
 
0.0236   
(0.0169)   
-0.183* 
(0.0947)   
0.0629 
(0.0749) 
English  0.0279** 
(0.0137)   
-0.102   
(0.0719)   
0.0979 
(0.0634) 
Economics  0.0788** 
(0.0157)   
0.275** 
(0.0759)   
0.405 
(0.0793) 
Public Policy  0.0719** 
(0.0220)   
0.322** 
(0.105)   
0.386** 
(0.111) 
Political Science  0.0438** 
(0.0145)   
0.130* 
(0.0724)   
0.215** 
(0.0701) 
Psychology  0.0189   
(0.0152)   
-0.116   
(0.0837)   
0.0570 
(0.0688) 
History  0.0390** 
(0.0138)   
0.137* 
(0.0720)   
0.196** 
(0.0673) 
MAE  0.0357** 
(0.0166)   
-0.0707   
(0.0843)   
0.137* 
(0.0762) 
EE/CS  0.0755** 
(0.0167)   
0.148* 
(0.0810)   
0.359** 
(0.0820) 
Arch & Civ  0.0659** 
(0.0164)   
0.0644   
(0.0816)   
0.296** 
(0.0790) 
Small Humanities  0.0272** 
(0.0136)   
-0.0694   
(0.0742)   
0.101 
(0.0635) 
Small Engineering  0.0541** 
(0.0183)   
0.0342   
(0.0981)   
0.239** 
(0.0874) 
Small Sciences  0.0161   
(0.0128)   
0.0264   







0.00439   
(0.0142)   
-0.0232   
(0.0811)   
0.0143 
(0.0656) 
American Studies  0.0619** 
(0.0145)   
0.160** 
(0.0635)   
0.303** 
(0.0700) 
Latin  -0.0158   
(0.0261)   
0.0469   
(0.218)   
-0.0595 
(0.130) 
Finance  0.0382   
(0.0240)   
0.316** 




Theater  -0.0326** 
(0.0153)   
-0.380** 
(0.145)   
-0.197** 
(0.0669) 
Public Policy  -0.00178   
(0.0158)   
-0.0841   
(0.0947)   
-0.0229 
(0.0717) 
Other Engineering  0.0143   
(0.0160)   
0.0218   
(0.0975)   
0.0650 
(0.0756) 
Other Sciences  -0.00552   
(0.0114)   
-0.171** 
(0.0735)   
-0.0540 
(0.0504) 
Other Humanities  -0.00849   
(0.00792)   
-0.111** 
(0.0527)   
-0.0557 
(0.0354) 
Teaching  0.000168   
(0.0150)   
-0.195* 
(0.103)   
-0.0351 
(0.0690) 
Reunion  0.110** 
(0.00311)   
0.461** 
(0.0188)   
0.586** 
(0.0159) 
Magazine  -0.0122 
(0.0103)   
-0.000378   
(0.0623)   
-0.0521 
(0.0459) 
AC Mailable  -0.00159   
(0.0209)   
-0.611** 
(0.185)   
-0.120 
(0.102) 
AG Mailable  0.0544** 
(0.00727)   
0.214** 
(0.0393)   
0.270** 
(0.0372) 
AG Phonable  0.148** 
(0.00612)   
0.339** 
(0.0966)   
0.656** 
(0.0589) 
No Solicit  -0.00199   
(0.0123)   
0.104   
(0.104)   
0.0105 
(0.0582) 
Reduce Solicit  -0.259** 
(0.00558)   
0.0225   
(0.0629)   
-1.10** 
(0.0133) 
SP Participant  0.0828** 
(0.00566)   
0.121** 
(0.0340)   
0.377** 
(0.0296) 
No Dues  -0.0618** 
(0.00523)   
-0.0657* 
(0.0394)   
-0.274** 
(0.0220) 
Current Dues  0.0740** 
(0.00494) 
0.289** 








0.0130   
(0.00931)   
-0.171** 
(0.0517)   
0.0219 
(0.0415) 
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Masters  0.0245** 
(0.00648)   
-0.217** 
(0.0377)   
0.0604 
(0.0289) 
JD  0.0497** 
(0.00786)   
0.128** 
(0.0395)   
0.240** 
(0.0377) 
MD/DDS  0.000361   
(0.00885)   
0.0226   
(0.0493)   
0.00569 
(0.0405) 
MBA  0.0592** 
(0.00835)   
0.290** 




Column (1) shows the incremental effects on the probability of making a gift in a given year, based on a probit mod-
el and using 139,869 observations. Column (2) shows the incremental effects on the amount of the gift, conditional 
on making gift, using ordinary least squares and using observations with a positive gift in the month of June, a total 
of 36,039 observations. Column (3) combines these, and shows the marginal effects on total giving. The figures in 
parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level are marked with **; 
those significant at the 10% level are marked with *. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering based on individu-
als. In addition to the variables listed, the regressions include year, location, and class effects, as well as a constant, 
which are not reported for brevity. 